Can someone forge email from a B.C. public body?
Type the part after the @ in their staff email addresses. You'll see what their DNS records tell other mail servers to do with a fake.
Week 45, 2026
4 of 20 B.C. public bodies tell other mail servers to refuse forged mail.
Scanned 2 November 2026. The list covers 20 bodies so far: the largest cities, regional districts, school districts and health authorities. More are being added.
By sector
Bar segments show how many bodies in each sector are at each level. The same numbers are in the table below.
- ENFORCEDForged mail refused
- PARTIALFiled as spam, or only some refused
- MONITORINGReports only, no action
- UNPROTECTEDNo usable instruction
Show these numbers as a table
| Sector | Enforced | Partial | Monitoring | Unprotected | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Municipalities | 2 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 8 |
| Regional districts | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| School districts | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Health authorities | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 6 |
Share at ENFORCED, last 12 weeks
Since last week, 0 bodies tightened their policy and 0 loosened it.
How the check works
- Once a week, the scanner asks DNS for each domain's DMARC, SPF, MX, MTA-STS and TLS reporting records, plus a few common DKIM keys.
- It reads the DMARC policy to set the level, and checks SPF for the mistakes that make it fail outright.
- Totals by sector are published here. Results for individual bodies are sent to them privately, not posted.
What it can't tell you
- Whether a body's mail filters catch forged mail sent to its own staff. That happens inside their systems.
- Whether DKIM is set up, if they use a selector name we didn't try.
- Anything about websites, passwords or networks. Only public email records are read.